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Introduction 
In this paper I’m going to talk about very basic kinds of technology, and how these contribute 
to the enaction of disability. I’ll first sketch some commonplaces concerning the body and 
technology, before outlining my own position on these: that the body has a fundamental 
relationality, of which technology comprises an aspect. Then I’ll outline inter-mundane 
technology (a low level artefactuality that supports activity while falling outside awareness, 
so that its contribution goes unacknowledged and the activity appears natural) and the 
technological unconscious (habituated expectation about how the world is). Finally, I’ll 
discuss how norms materialised in inter-mundane technologies lead to one way disability gets 
enacted, to erode bodily confidence in the world. 
 
1. Objective Embodiment and Instrumental Technology 
I’ll initially sketch the models of body and technology that I oppose. First is the objective 
model of the body. This, unsurprisingly, takes the body as a mere object: something like a 
‘brute’ or ‘natural fact’. The body possesses clear boundaries, and can be described 
exhaustively and accurately from a scientific standpoint. It is separate from subjectivity or 
personhood. As self-identical and adequate to itself, it requires nothing more to be what it is. 
It is the realisation of its genetic blueprint, itself produced by brute natural forces. Any 
subsequent modification does not change its essence. In it, past and present effectively 
coincide: its biological causal history defines what it is, once and for all. Finally, it is a neutral 
substratum. Whatever is thought about, or indeed as, a body, its biological basis is unaffected. 
Overall, from this perspective relations, temporality, and normativity are inessential to the body. 
This fundamentally misconceives what is characteristic about organisms. I reject 
objective embodiment separate from ‘consciousness’, for an account in which the body is a 
locus of pragmatic action: an ‘organ’ of movement and connection, both within, and opening 
onto, the world. This is grounded in the primacy of movement, which is, put simply, transition 
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towards or away from something to which the body attributes positive or negative value.1 
This means that three aspects that objective embodiment deems inessential—relationality, 
temporality and normativity—are instead fundamental and constitutive dimensions of living 
bodies. Relationality means that, as active, the body is continually drawn outside itself and 
into relations with other things. It does not terminate at the dermal boundary, but exists in 
relations with its milieu. This also involves temporality: as always acting beyond itself, the 
body is primordially orientated towards the future. Every situation the body enters into is 
simultaneously “its own range of possible appearances and actions”.2 A living body never 
definitively here or now, but is always outside and ahead of itself: it has a “non-simple location 
in that it is never wholly within one specifiable locus [and is] always already on the way to 
somewhere else”.3 Finally, normativity is likewise basic. Living beings do not apprehend the 
world as bare objects, but as situations laced with meaning according to value or potential for 
embodied activity.4 There is no world except meaningful situations given to the body, and no 
experience of the body except as orientated towards those situations. In sum, the living body 
is always disposed towards some activity in the world, through which activity it produces 
itself. 
For human animals,5 one aspect—perhaps the preeminent aspect—of their basic 
relationality involves technology. Technologies, however, are more usually understood as 
external tools.6 I’ll quickly outline this instrumentalist understanding, and several ontological 
presuppositions that flow from its oppositions between natural and artificial, human and 
nonhuman.7 I’ll call instrumentalism’s basic premiss the principle of externality. Technologies 
                                                
1 That is, as in Spinoza, the body is given as a power of acting, which is apprehended as a feeling of capacity. Benedict 
Spinoza, Ethics (London: Penguin, 1996). 
2 Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi, "Thinking Technology with Merleau-Ponty," in Postphenomenological 
Investigations: Essays on Human-Technology Relations, ed. Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek, 
Postphenomenology and the Philosophy of Technology (London: Lexington Books, 2015), 78. 
3 John McCumber, "Why Is Time Different From Space?," in Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy 
in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell, Andrew Cutrofello and Paul M. Livingston (London: Routledge, 2016), 
201. 
4 The perceiver does not simply see a chair with a particular set of determinable properties, but as within or beyond 
reach, as comfortable looking, as containing potential for this or that activity. This is not judgement made about prior 
perceptual experience, but is basic to perceptual experience. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, "Though in Action," in The 
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, ed. Dan Zahavi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
5 I take ‘human’ here as the same kind of object as ‘gender’ or ‘race’: an entity that is not given, but produced through 
interactions. I’ll remain agnostic here about what explains how these objects come about. 
6 Verbeek and Vermaas identify early forms of instrumentalism in Kapp (1877) for whom technology is the projection 
of organs, and Gehlen, for whom humans are Mangelwesen: deficient and in need of technologies to compensate for this 
in order to survive in an environment to which they are not naturally adapted. Peter-Paul Verbeek and Pieter E. 
Vermaas, "Technological Artifacts," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, ed. Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Stig 
Andur Pedersen and Vincent F. Hendricks (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
7 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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are fully exterior to the human. They are mere means, awaiting use towards autonomously-
formulated human ends.8 They are epistemically and morally neutral, or at the very least, 
“subservient to values established in other… spheres”.9 Second is the principle of essentialism. 
If technology is external and neutral, whatever it permits merely augments or reflects 
preexisting capacities or values. This not only presumes pre-technological human capacities 
and values, but that there is a pre-technological human. Third is the principle of autonomy. 
Humans are autonomous subjects for whom technology is an objective means of extending 
freedom. Freedom as such requires—in principle, if not always in fact—no additional material 
for its exercise.10 Technologies extend human freedom that passes through them while leaving 
no trace.11 Overall, technology makes no profound contribution to human actions (it only 
contributes secondarily, as an extension), and has no enduring effect upon the category of ‘the 
human’. 
 
2. An Alternative Account of Body and Technology 
So, a common way of comprehending the human-technology relation is that technology is 
separate from and dependent upon the human. Technology merely describes so many objects 
used by humans towards autonomous goals. Of course, there are other ways to understand 
this relation. I suggested that the body exists through active, constitutive relations with its 
milieu. The human milieu is technological. The human is a technical animal (as are certain 
nonhuman animals), where technics refers less to technological objects, and more to a 
constitutive relation of embodied activity with external things, through which extra-
organismic materials are profoundly incorporated. 
I’ll briefly mention two approaches with which I broadly agree. The first considers 
technology internal to perceptual experience or embodied activity. Unlike instrumentalism—
wherein artefacts merely expedite or extend preexisting capacities—here the technological 
contribution is substantive. Artefacts may by involved in perception to co-constitute modes 
of world disclosure; or within bodily activity to be at least partially-responsible for availability 
                                                
8 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
9 Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 
Peter Kroes and Peter-Paul Verbeek, "Introduction: The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts," in The Moral Status of 
Technical Artefacts, ed. Peter Kroes and Peter-Paul Verbeek, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2014).  
10 This property is often fundamental to definition of the human. 
11 As Kroes and Verbeek interestingly note, positive metaphors about technology tend to ascribe goodness to the 
wisdom of its human users, while negative assessments indict technology precisely for having its own autonomy: while 
a human creation, it goes on to resist, override, or even determine, human will. 
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and exercise of such actions. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s description of the visually-impaired 
man who incorporates his cane within bodily intentionality, such that this technology is not 
external, but one point of sensitivity among others,12 or the more quotidian eyeglasses. In 
each case artefacts are significant for, or internal to, the activity: without them the action 
would be different, even impossible. That technology becomes familiar, no longer feels 
separate, is thanks to the character of involved, prereflective bodily projection, and what Don 
Ihde calls the “polymorphous sense of bodily extension”:13 that the scope of the body schema 
is unfixed, and can expand and contract relative to what technological relations are embodied. 
This allows technologies to mediate body and world transformatively, while awareness of 
body and technology withdraws into the experiential background: focus goes ‘through’ these 
to the activity their coupling enables.14 I propose that this can be pressed further still. 
Thought and action not only overspill embodiment. The activity emerges within, and 
supervenes upon, the dynamic processes of interaction between bodies and environments.15 
The activity is located precisely in or as the relation, not in the things that are in relation. 
A second way to understand this relation involves the technological genesis of the human 
as such. This can be summarised by the claim that human and technology develop together. This 
is similar to Bernard Stiegler’s claim that the human has an ‘epiphylogenesis’: technology is 
essential to the human, which has always incorporated extrinsic materials, and evolves by 
externalising itself in technical artefacts.16 However minimally, all activity has some 
technological dimension, whether proximal (like previous examples wherein some artefact—
a cane, a notebook, glasses17—is incorporated within bodily comportment to enable or 
transform action and cognition) or distal (the deep historical provenance of technologies 
structuring present activities). This definition of technology is very broad, and involves very 
basic and mundane instances. It describes any product of technê: the activity by which living 
beings modify the world which is, for Stiegler, to incorporate external materials within 
activity. This tendency to self-exteriorisation, composition and assemblage makes the human 
essentially undetermined, or more correctly, determined through and dependent upon 
                                                
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald Landes (London: Routledge, 2012). 
13 Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1990), 74. 
14 Ibid., 32. They fall within the subject pole of the subject-object structure. Eyeglasses may sit between seer and seen; 
vision may go through them. Nonetheless, the referent is ‘outside’ body and glasses. This is as much the case for audial 
as for visual perception, and obtains for simple and complex technologies alike. 
15 John Protevi, Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
16 This externalisation is mirrored within the subject as what Stiegler calls la vie d’esprit. 
17  Ihde, Technology and the Life World. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind", Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998). 
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creative engagement with artefacts. Its being is to negotiate human-nonhuman boundaries 
via “a long line of technical prostheses such as flint stones and other ‘memory devices’ that 
have played an active role in the very process of the constitution of the human”.18 
This doesn’t mean that elaboration of the human is a reciprocal relation between two 
kinds of object: bodily and technological. Living beings exist in heterogeneous ensembles of 
relations with other bodies, other organisms, practices and knowledges, and so on, none of 
which enjoys absolute ontological or explanatory priority.19 The salience and effects of any 
one interactant—even organismic structure—are a function of its interactions with every 
other. Before such relations they are only potential. Potential gets actualised through entry 
into relations. How it gets actualised depends upon the relations. Nevertheless, I’m 
suggesting that such ensembles do typically have a persistent technological dimension, 
insofar as bodies are perpetually in relation with situations whose arrangement is worked 
over by human activity. 
 
3. Inter-mundane Technology and Disability 
I’ll now discuss two concepts—one mode of technology, and one disposition towards 
technology—that together contribute to one way that disability happens. I’ll call the mode 
inter-mundane technology. By this, I mean something like Don Ihde’s ‘background relations’. 
Earlier I discussed embodied relations: relations where technologies withdraw into the 
background of awareness relative to the activity that they allow. When looking or 
hammering, we don’t focus on eyeglasses or hammer. Background relations, by contrast, fall 
much farther outside attention. They concern technologies that operate as fully withdrawn. 
Ihde discusses such pervasive technological scaffolds as shelter technology, traffic control 
systems, automatic and semiautomatic household appliances, lighting and temperature 
systems.20 These are fully present as absent to consciousness, because they manifest as part of 
the environment (into which they disappear). They invisibly accompany and support humans 
                                                
18 Joanna Zylinska, "Playing God, Playing Adam: The Politics and Ethics of Enhancement", Bioethical Inquiry 7, no. 2 
(2010). 
19 They are something like the Foucauldian dispositif, the Deleuzoguattarian assemblage, the Latourian quasi-object. 
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978). 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987). Bruno Latour, "An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”", New Literary 
History 41, no. 3 (2010): 471-490. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. 
20 Ihde, Technology and the Life World 108. 
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as they traverse the world. As such, they structure the world in important ways without 
drawing attention to themselves. 
I’ll modify Ihde’s definition somewhat. By inter-mundane technology I mean, first, 
anything artefactual that generally does not signal itself as such.21 Activities in which these 
are involved can be complex or simple. Walking usually involves technology. A path is as 
much a technology—for expediting travel, demarcating territory, domesticating ‘wilderness’, 
modifying spatio-temporal relations—as a stone adze or a smartphone. It is a human 
modification of the world whose contribution goes unnoticed. Besides surfaces, we could think 
of dimensions of mundane spaces, distances between buildings, lighting and shade, gradients, 
and associated temporal implications. Inter-mundane technologies are one concrete 
dimension of relations into which bodies enter when traversing environments. 
A second aspect is that these technologies are not for specific bodies, but supposed to befit 
bodies-in-general, a ‘generic human’. It’s just this aspect that I dispute. This brings us to 
ability and disability. First, I’ll note that this approach suggests that much that seems natural 
and spontaneous involves a technologically-scaffolded dimension. Any apparently 
spontaneous use of tools is a function not only of the body, but of relations with an available 
sympathetic milieu. If activity is a function of relations, this implies the ubiquity of a composite 
or distributed agency,22 and that the notion of a fully autonomous human—with ideal 
‘ability’—is somewhat spurious. Fully context-transcendent ability would imply an originary, 
self-sufficient, complete human, as though in the state of nature, a condition representing “the 
absence of relation”.23 
To say ‘all bodies are technologically-enabled’ remains inadequate. While technologies 
and bodies develop together, this has been partial and uneven. Technological artefacts are 
materialisations of values. As intended to act on or for bodies—they have what Latour calls 
‘programs of action’24—artefacts embody expectations about users. Just as technology 
embodies norms, so technological milieus presuppose certain bodily competencies. These may 
go unacknowledged, leading to materialisation within artefacts of unexamined partialities, 
                                                
21 Admittedly, I am stretching Ihde’s argument beyond its original scope. I propose that while modifications of 
environments differ in certain aspects from technologies worn in and on the body, they each are examples of ways in 
which there is a technological modification of the body-world relation. 
22 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern. Lucas D Introna, "Towards a Post-human Intra-actional Account of 
Sociomaterial Agency (and Morality)," in The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts, ed. Peter Kroes and Peter-Paul 
Verbeek, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
23 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Geoffrey Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 128. 
24 Bruno Latour, "On Technical Mediation", Common Knowledge 3, no. 2 (1994): 29-64. 
 
7 
embodied as programs of action that interact with the programs of moving bodies.25 Non-
normative bodies have been scarcely considered during elaboration of inter-mundane 
technology. Spaces for action are grounded on an ontogenetic history of body-technology 
interactions, practices to harmonise relations between bodies and things. 
Inter-mundane technologies pattern environments differently and non-neutrally, such 
that the ’normal body’ is given implicitly within embodied relations. This creates asymmetry 
in how such technologies afford activity. Contexts delimit in advance which activities are 
available, and which bodies are assigned value. This disjuncture brings into being one aspect 
of disability. Strictly speaking, disability does not reduce to physical properties, but comes 
about within an ensemble. It is not intrinsic to an atypical body that it cannot act in a milieu; 
a historically elaborated milieu accommodates only typical bodies. This does not deny that 
ability has degrees, only that it is specifiable independent of context and activity. There is no 
disability antecedent of situation, only disabling and enabling relations. This makes 
occurrence not merely spatial but temporal.26 In a time-worn example, a wheelchair-user only 
becomes disabled when acting within unsympathetically organised space.27 
I don't mean by this that impairment—here, that of a wheelchair-user—is an natural fact 
prior to entry into social space. All bodies exist at the intersection of myriad heterogeneous 
relations, and have no ‘nature’ prior to these. For the ‘disabled person’ those interacting 
dimensions include DNA, phenotype, law, discourse, science, medicine, spatial arrangements, 
technologies. That disability does not correlate with biology does not entail that phenotype 
is irrelevant. Phenotype can play a role, but rarely is there—nor need there be—an inevitable 
correlation with certain effects. Just as with normative bodies, its reality is produced in 
relations with other dimensions. 
 
4. The Role of the Technological Unconscious 
                                                
25 Latour calls these ‘scripts’. These embody tacit roles for user actions. These scripts translate human actions into 
different forms: a speed bump with the program ‘damage the suspension of fast-moving cars’ translates ‘drive fast’ into 
‘slow down to avoid damage’. In this way, objects shape the goals, and indeed formulations of goals, of human agents, 
and delegate to objects the responsibility for enacting those programs (i.e., they are materialised norms). Ibid. 
26 Thus, disability is relational in the sense meant by Carol Thomas—brought about in the interplay between bodies, 
projects and norms—but also in the wider sense of depending for existence upon intercorporeal relations between a 
plurality of bodies. I part company with Thomas is in her general alliance to Marxist materialism and essentialist view 
of impairment.. Carol Thomas, "How Is Disability Understood? An Examination of Sociological Approaches", 
Disability & Society 19, no. 6 (2004). Thomas, "Rescuing a Social Relational Understanding of Disability", Scandinavian 
Journal of Disability Research 6, no. 1 (2004). 
27 While it may seem counterintuitive, the same holds for intellectually disability: impairment manifests only in relation 
to the performance of a certain task. 
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This is one aspect of what I’m calling unsafe ground. The other concerns the role within 
activity of expectation about the technical milieu. Here I'll discuss ‘technological unconscious’: 
an embodied dimension that Nigel Thrift, citing Patricia Clough, calls a “prepersonal 
substrate of guaranteed correlations, assured encounters, and therefore unconsidered 
anticipations”.28 Repeated correlations, positionings and juxtapositionings, amongst bodies 
and things within technological spaces that presuppose particular competencies, incarnate 
norms about the body within prereflective practice. Comportments get harmonised with 
normative technological spaces. Environments show up as “spaces of anticipation”.29 
Expectation becomes ‘the way things are’. Myriad relations—with objects, situations, 
routes—accrue ontological fixity and naturalness. Crucially, as involving prepersonal bodily 
dispositions, this includes a felt sense that bodies and things have correct and incorrect 
postures, positions and dispositions. Purportedly natural space is freighted with a deep sense 
of rightness and wrongness. This is abetted by the propensity of technological relations to 
withdraw from awareness, allowing technological contributions to fall by the wayside. This 
is especially pointed with inter-mundane forms. 
Normative bodies disproportionately enjoy unquestioned anticipations, and associated 
sense of confidence. Indeed, withdrawal can only occur in an expected and congruous context. 
Technologies can only contribute to activity and withdraw from awareness if in accord with 
the body in question. When things go smoothly—when there is a fit between normative 
bodies and inter-mundane space—prepersonal expectations are fulfilled, the semblance of 
naturalness is achieved, and conventional aspects do not surface. 
Disability has such a temporal aspect: it is implicated within future-orientation. Norms 
laid down in the artefactuality of the world—including, as we have seen, those that 
presuppose normative embodiment—structure how possibility shows up, and thereby 
contribute to the basic structure of tracing out possible action. Lived space is apprehended as 
eliciting certain actions, inter-mundane situations studded with norms soliciting ‘what 
everyone does’. The atypical body is in the midst of a world traced out by potential it cannot 
actualise, or where its comportment to some extent mis-matches context. Disjuncture arises 
between possibility and actuality, intention and realisation. Or, by contrast, the very lack of 
affordances might be recognised, leading to hesitation. 
                                                
28 Nigel Thrift, "Remembering the Technological Unconscious by Foregrounding Knowledges of Position", 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, no. 1 (2004). 
29 Ibid., 175. 
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This means that where normative bodies for the most part enjoy implicit support, and can 
have unquestioned confidence about relations with the world (without recognising relations 
as relations), for non-normative bodies a permanent question hangs over the reliability of 
relations. This can freight the future with a negative ambiguity. This is all the more pertinent 
if, as I maintain, possibility comprises a substantive aspect of existence. If temporal passage 
is characterised as having a world through experience of significant possibilities and 
meaningful change, this very structure may be modified.30 Lost confidence attenuates 
anticipatory structure: the sense of possibility—potential to imagine otherwise—is 
dampened. Where sense of possibility is attenuated, intentional threads connecting 
protention to what Matthew Ratcliffe calls ‘teleological time’—directedness toward more 
remote but not necessarily less-determinate goals—are slackened.31 Instead of a future of 
significant possibility, there is one where possibilities are curbed. 
The fulfilment of prepersonal expectations of normative bodies about inter-mundane 
space conceals the underlying contingency of the relations that ensure such fulfilment. This 
reinforces the sense that the actions of normative bodies are spontaneous and free, and that 
such capacities are inherent property of their body, as well as that the environment is neutral 
or natural. By contrast, mis-fit or disharmony between non-normative bodies and apparently 
neutral inter-mundane space gives the impression of natural pathology: that disharmony 
flows fully from the atypical body. What is crucial here is that while arbitrary and 
conventional, inter-mundane technology and technological unconsciousness convey a sense 
of inevitability. This very mundanity make the activities they support seem all the more 
natural, but this also means that the basic relationality and contribution of technologies gets 
elided. Indeed, this is one way that disability’s very heterogeneity—that it has multiple, 
relational determinants—gets simplified and reduced. It is transformed back into objective, 
‘natural’ somatic properties32. This resembles Bruno Latour’s thesis that life for the most part 
unfolds among a tangle of overlapping and heterogeneous hybrids, that modern thought sorts 
into the overarching categories ‘Nature’ and Society’.33 
 
                                                
30 Matthew Ratcliffe, "Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression", The Journal of medicine and philosophy 37, no. 2 
(2012): doi:10.1093/jmp/jhs010. Matthew Ratcliffe, Mark Ruddell and Benedict Smith, "What Is a "sense of 
Foreshortened Future?" A Phenomenological Study of Trauma, Trust, and Time", Frontiers in Psychology 5 (2014). 
31 Lisa Diedrich, "Breaking Down: A Phenomenology of Disability" 20, no. 2 (2001). 
32 This assumes bodily activity and ability are merely matters of natural forces. 
33 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 




By contrast, all activity involves relations. If living is the movement of bodily self-
transcendence—the body not something one has, but that one does—then whatever 
contributes to that activity is, for the duration of the relation, a part of that living being. This 
is just as true of intra-mundane components as of more conspicuous prosthetics. Indeed, I’m 
not sure there is any difference in kind between embodied technologies, and those that are 
not. Intra-mundane technologies form a persistent dimension of the activity of moving bodies. 
This means that for non-normative bodies, one aspect of their being—that contributes to self-
constitution or ontogenesis—is consistently unsympathetic. This ungrounds anticipation and 
attenuates or delimits potential. Importantly, since much of this can occur at a prepersonal 
level, it is felt more than known. It is the sense of felt possibilities relative to the body, but 
where only the body, and not its relations, are recognised as their source. It is a constant 
affective dampener on embodied potential. Moreover, since each interactant in an ensemble 
of relations affects the contribution of every other, this dampening can inflect how other 
relations manifest. Unsafe ground might interact with somatic dimensions (environs 
condition how phenotype manifests: what one can physically do, how much fatigue should be 
expected); with dispositions (how open one is to the unexpected, to risk); with discourse (how 
willing one is to accept diagnosis, or identify as disabled). Of course, these are all in constant, 
mutually-conditioning interaction. 
I’ll end by noting that I’m very optimistic about possibilities afforded to non-normative 
bodies by technological developments. It remains the case that outstanding metaphysical 
baggage must get cleared out on the way, since, as embedded in concrete everyday practices, 
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